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Abstract During a stock market peak the price of a given stock (i) jumps from an initial level
p1(i) to a peak level p2(i) before falling back to a bottom level p3(i). The ratios A(i) = p2(i)/p1(i)
and B(i) = p3(i)/p1(i) are referred to as the peak- and bottom-amplitude respectively. The paper
shows that for a sample of stocks there is a linear relationship between A(i) and B(i) of the form:
B = 0.4A+b. In words, this means that the higher the price of a stock climbs during a bull market the
better it resists during the subsequent bear market. That rule, which we call the resilience pattern, also
applies to other speculative markets. It provides a useful guiding line for Monte Carlo simulations.
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1 Introduction
Traffic jams are fairly unpredictable because they depend upon a large number of factors, e.g. timing
in the traffic, weather conditions, highway maintenance, automobile accidents, some of which are
completely random. However once begun, traffic jams display fairly recurrent patterns as to average
duration, behavior of the drivers, and so on. This traffic jam parallel has been introduced by Charles
Tilly [12] in the context of historical sociology in order to explain why revolutions can hardly be
predicted. It also applies to the occurrence of speculative price peaks: the downturn of price peaks can
hardly be predicted because they depend upon a number of (possibly) exogenous factors1. However,
as is the case for traffic jams, once a price peak is under way it obeys some definite rules; accordingly
its outcome can to some extent be predicted at the level of individual companies.
More precisely we focus our attention on the relationship between the prices at the beginning of the
peak, at the peak and at the end of the peak. We denote by p1 the price level at the start of the peak,
by p2 the price at the peak and by p3 the bottom price at the end of the falling price path; we further
introduce the peak amplitude A = p2/p1 and the bottom amplitude B = p3/p1. A and B can be
defined for any company in the market; for instance on the NASDAQ where there are currently more
than 5,000 companies listed A and B can be seen as variables for which there are several thousand
realizations. In the next section we show that A and B are closely correlated; with a correlation of the
order of 0.75 the following regression holds:
B = aA+ b (1)
where a is usually of the order of 0.4. The fact that a is positive means that the higher the peak
amplitude, the larger the bottom amplitude; in other words the higher the price of a stock climbs
during the rising phase (bull market) the better it resists during the falling phase (bear market). The
regularity summarized by equation (1) will be referred to as the resilience pattern.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the second section the statistical methodology is explained, then the
resilience pattern is established and illustrated through several case studies: we consider three stock
market peaks, one price bubble for postage stamps and two real estate bubbles. In the conclusion we
discuss the possible implications of the resilience pattern.
2 The resilience pattern
2.1 Methodology
Let us consider a typical price peak such as the one in Fig.1. While it is easy to identify the moment
t2 when the price reaches its peak level p2, the determination of the initial moment t1 (corresponding
to p1) and the end moment t3 (corresponding to p3) is not so easy. Fortunately, as will be seen
subsequently, the relationship (1) does not depend upon the choice of t1 or t2 in a critical way.
A peak will be delimited in two steps (i) At the global level of the whole market the price peak is
identified by using a broad annual index; in that way one already gets a rough definition of t1, t2, t3
(ii) At the level of individual companies t1 will be selected as the first year for which the annual price
change is positive, t2 as the peak year and t3 as the last year for which the annual price change is
negative. Let us illustrate the procedure on an example (Fig.1). As one knows there was a short bull
1 For instance it has been argued (Business Line 8 May 2000) that the spurt in the NASDAQ composite index that
occurred in December 1999 and January 2000 was fueled by a Y2K-motivated injection of money into the banking system.
Needless to say, no model will ever be able to take into account such circumstantial factors. However, the present paper
suggests that when a market rallies or plummets there are some structural invariants which are independent of triggering
factors.
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market on the NYSE after World War I which culminated in 1920; thus, for the great majority of the
stocks the first positive price change was 1921-1922, which leads us to t1 = 1921. At the end of 1929
the downturn occurred very abruptly which means that for almost all stocks t2 = 1929. By and large
the market bottomed out in 1931; yet for some stocks such as for instance Consolidated Edison the
fall continued until 1935; in that case one would take t3 = 1935.
Once the limits of the peak have been determined for each individual stock, the ratios p2/p1 and
p3/p1 are computed for the deflated prices; then the correlation and regressions are carried out for the
sample of stocks under consideration. We now apply this procedure to several case studies.
2.2 Stock markets
As far as stock markets are concerned there is often a tendency to over-emphasize the importance of
crashes, by which we understand a rapid fall occurring within one or two weeks, at the expense of
the long and steady declines that (in some cases) follow the crash. Crashes are impressive because
of their suddenness, but it is not obvious and probably not even true, that crashes have a determining
influence on the medium-term (i.e. yearly) evolution of markets. A slide that continues for over two
or three years may have more significance for the stock market and for the rest of the economy than
the crash itself. A case in point is the parallel between the crashes of October 1929 and October 1987
on the NYSE (Fig.2). The price paths were very similar during the crashes and the six subsequent
months; but, as one knows, the ultimate outcomes were very different. This observation suggests that
steady slides (which are the topic of this paper) and abrupt crashes are two different phenomena.
Applying the procedure delineated above, we obtain the results given in Table 1. Note that the down-
turn in Paris occurred in February 1929 and cannot therefore be considered as a consequence of the
Wall Street crash; incidentally, in Germany the downturn took place in June 1928 that is to say more
than one year before the downturn on the NYSE. The analysis for the NYSE is based on the behavior
of 85 individual stocks. The correlation is 0.87 for equation (1) and the distribution of sample points
in the (A,B) plane is shown in Fig.3; it displays the range of both amplitudes and permits to verify
that there is no non-linear effect.
Since this is the largest sample considered in Table 1, it can can be of interest to take a closer look
at the statistical distribution of the amplitudes: A and B have an average of 5.6 and 2.0 respectively
and the standard deviations are 5.0 and 2.3. Moreover it turns out that both A and B are distributed
according to a log-normal density. This could have been expected; indeed, stock prices follow a log-
normal law, at least in first approximation that is to say for time-samples of moderate size and time
intervals larger than one day, and one knows that the ratio of two log-normal random variables is also
a log-normal random variable.
The analysis of the Paris stock market is not based on individual stocks but on a set of indexes cor-
responding to 19 different economic sectors, e.g. banks, coal mines, railroads, electricity, chemicals,
etc. Some indexes comprise more individual stocks than others, for instance the bank index comprises
20 banks while the electricity index has only 11; on average there are about 14 companies per sector.
The results for the B versus A regression are given in Table 1: the a estimate is fairly close to the one
obtained for the NYSE. The analysis of the 1989 peak on the Tokyo market is also based on indexes
corresponding to different economic sectors. With as many as 26 different sectors the classification
given in the Japan Statistical Yearbook is even more detailed than the previous one. It is not obvious
whether that peak began in 1985 or in 1980. It is true that the increase between 1980 and 1985 was
not monotonic, but one can argue with good reason that these fluctuations were rather circumstantial.
It is reassuring to observe that by taking t1 = 1980 one is lead to estimates which are fairly similar
to those obtained for t1 = 1985; the fact that the correlation is higher in the first case in fact suggests
that t1 = 1980 is the most “natural” starting point.
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On the basis of the resilience pattern it could seem that one can invest in high-growth companies
without much risk. This is not completely true however for that rule only concerns the medium-term
behavior in the vicinity of a given peak; it does not guarantee that in the long-run the price of a stock
which has experienced a huge peak will continue to increase. A spectacular counter-example is shown
in Fig.4. Not only did the price of Columbia Gas System never again reach the level it had attained in
1929 but it remained far below.
2.3 Other speculative markets
The consideration of other speculative markets relies on the implicit assumption that the basic mech-
anisms of speculation are similar for any speculative market. In this paragraph we examine the cases
of postage stamp and real estate markets. These markets are particularly suited for this kind of in-
vestigation because (i) they have large price peaks and (ii) they comprise a large number of different
items which will play the same role as individual stocks or economic sectors in our previous study.
During Word War II there was a postage stamp bubble in France which was triggered by the fact that
inflation was high (the consumer price index increased from 130 in 1941 to 350 in 1945) while at
the same time, due to war restrictions there was only a small outlet for consumption. Thus almost
all stamps experienced a price peak (usually culminating in 1944) with their real (i.e. deflated) price
multiplied by a factor of 3 or 4. The present investigation focuses on 19th century French stamps.
Table 1 shows that the correlation between peak and bottom amplitude although still significant is
smaller than in previous cases. This can possibly be attributed to the fact that the prices given in stamp
catalogs are estimates made by stamp experts and traders rather than real market prices. Estimates
are particularly difficult to make for stamps which are not traded very often; such is the case for the
stamps which are particularly rare and expensive. Now (see in this respect [11] ) the expensive stamps
are also those for which the peak amplitude A is largest and any bias for large A sample points will
notably affect the correlation and the slope of the regression line.
Our next example concerns the real estate market in Paris. Between 1985 and 1995 there was a price
peak which resulted in a doubling, and in some areas a three fold increase, of apartment prices. First,
we consider the prices in 20 different districts (“arrondissements”) of downtown Paris (i.e. the so-
called “Paris intra-muros” area). The regression leads to values for the correlation and for the slope
of the regression line which are similar to those obtained in the case of stock markets. As shown in
Fig.5 the sample points in the (A,B) plane are evenly distributed along the regression line and do not
display any obvious non-linear effect.
The second result concerns the same price peak but for apartments according to their size (from one-
to five-room). Not surprisingly, due to the small number of sample points the error margin is fairly
large; note that the value a = 0.4 obtained in previous cases is within the error bars.
Up to that point all our results were consistent with the resilience pattern, but the following case lead
to an unexpected result. It concerns the real estate bubble which occurred in Britain in the 1980s;
from the area of London where it started, it spread progressively northward to the rest of the country.
Price results can be analyzed at the level of each of the 11 regions composing Britain. The result came
as a surprise; in this case the amplitudes are negatively correlated and the correlation is fairly low.
In order to see if the negative correlation is found elsewhere it would be of great interest to perform
a similar test for other countries; unfortunately, in France reliable regional housing prices are only
available since 1995.
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Table 1 The resilience pattern: relationship between
peak amplitude (A) and bottom amplitude (B): B = aA+ b
Market Peak Number a b Correlation
of items
Stocks
1 NYSE 1929 Oct 85 0.40± 0.05 −0.27± 0.24 0.87
2 Paris 1929 Feb 19 0.44± 0.17 −0.03± 0.29 0.76
3a Tokyo 1989 Oct 26 0.39± 0.11 0.27± 0.10 0.80
3b Tokyo 1989 Oct 26 0.40± 0.09 0.35± 0.13 0.87
Stamps
4 France 1944 56 0.10± 0.08 0.77± 0.10 0.33
Real estate
5 Paris 1990 20 0.43± 0.16 0.73± 0.04 0.79
6 Paris 1990 5 0.14± 0.26 1.1± 0.1 0.52
7 Britain 1989 11 −0.10± 0.17 1.4± 0.05 −0.38
Average (except 7) 0.32 0.68
Notes: All prices used in the regression are real (i.e. deflated) prices. Case (3a) refers to t1 = 1985, while case
(3b) refers to t1 = 1980. For some reason yet to be understood the housing bubble in Britain does not follow
the resilience pattern (negative correlation).
Sources: 1: [1]; 2: Annuaire Statistique de la France, Re´sume´ Re´trospectif (1966, p.541); 3a,b: Japan Statistical
Yearbook (various years); 4: [5]; 5,6: Conseil par des notaires (23 Dec. 1991) and Chambre des Notaires; 7:
Halifax index.
3 Conclusion
About 60 percent of the 222 sample points in Table 1 concerned stock markets. Thus, the evidence
supporting the resilience pattern for stock markets was particularly strong. Yet, it was important
also to show that the resilience effect is not confined to stock markets for it suggests that a possible
theoretical framework should apply to other speculative markets as well. Let us now briefly discuss
the significance and possible implications of the present finding.
In the late 1990s econophysicists along with some economists ([3]) devoted great attention to the
statistical analysis of stock market indexes, the overall objective being the identification of possible
scaling laws. Yet, indexes do not give great insight into the internal mechanisms of stock markets.
Such an understanding can only be gained by opening the “black box” and studying the interactions
that take place between individual stocks. This idea has recently gained more acceptance as shown
by a number of innovative papers going into that direction; e.g. [3, 4, 6 ].
Finally, let us briefly consider the next step, namely the construction of a theoretical framework.
Obviously any model is (and has to be) a schematization of the real world; therefore, constructing
a “realistic” model cannot be a viable and suitable objective; models need more precise “targets”
and “guiding lights”. In a number of recent empirical studies we have tried to define such targets: the
sharp peak - flat trough pattern [9, 10], the price multiplier effect [7, 9], the relationship between stock
market crashes and increases in interest rate spread [8] define quantitative patterns which provide
5
useful guiding lights for the construction of a theoretical framework.
On the theoretical side some promising advances have been made recently which can possible provide
an adequate framework for the description of the internal machinery of stock markets. For instance
one would not be surprised to see percolation (see in this respect [2]) play a role in the spread of
a bubble; after all, a speculative outburst can be seen as propagating from high-growth stocks to
low-growth stocks in the same way as a technical innovation progressively gains acceptance in an
economy.
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Fig.1 Course of the price for three stocks versus Dow Jones Index. The prices are yearly highs. During the
bull market 1921-1929, the prices of Coca Cola and Columbia Gas (an utility company) have increased faster
and more than the DJ average, while the price of Burlington Northern (a railroad company) has increased slower
and less than the DJ. The circles and squares show the peaks and troughs respectively. The resilience pattern
reveals itself in the fact that when a peak is above (or below) the DJ average the same situation prevails for the
trough. Sources: Common stock price histories (log supplement); Dow Jones Investor’s handbook (1972).
Fig.2 Parallel between the crashes of 1929 and 1987. Monthly prices. During the 8 months before and
after the crash the behavior of the Dow Jones Index was very much the same in both cases; as one knows the
subsequent evolution was very different however. This suggests that crashes and long-lasting slides are two
distinct (and not necessarily related) phenomena. Sources: The Dow Jones averages 1885-1970; OECD main
economic indicators (1969-1988).
Fig.3 NYSE, 1921-1932 peak: distribution of 85 sample points in the (A,B) plane. Each triangle cor-
responds to a stock; the prices are yearly highs. Dotted line: linear regression (correlation is 0.87). Source:
Common stock price histories (log supplement).
Fig.4 Long-term behavior of the price of Columbia Gas System. The prices are yearly highs. The price
of that utility stock increased tremendously during the 1921-1929 bull market; then, from 1932 to 1936 it
fluctuated around 200 before falling to about 30; it never really recovered in the second half of the 20th century.
The chart does not cover the 1990s because there was a change in the name of the company; however it can
be noted that during the 1990-2000 bull market the Dow Jones Utilility index increased 1.7 times less than the
Standard and Poor’s 500; this would give a stock price of about 200 in year 2000, still well below the 1929
high. Source: Common stock price histories (log supplement).
Fig.5 Paris, 1985-1995 real estate peak: distribution of 20 sample points in the (A,B) plane. The num-
bers correspond to the 20 arrondissements. Source: Chambre des Notaires.
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